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INTRODUCTION 
Jeremy Bloom appears to epitomize the “All-American” kid: 
he was a member of his state champion high school football team, 
a track star, a skiing star, and a student with a 3.4 high school 
GPA.  Jeremy Bloom, however, is anything but typical.  His 
football prowess earned him a scholarship to play at the University 
of Colorado, while his skiing talents enabled him to compete for 
the U.S. Olympic Team in the 2002 Olympic Winter Games 
(hereinafter the “Games”) and earn the U.S. National and World 
Cup championship titles in mogul skiing in the same year.1  Bloom 
was also a two-time Colorado State track and field champion.  His 
good looks, meanwhile, have provided him with numerous 
modeling and entertainment opportunities, including a lucrative 
contract with Tommy Hilfiger.2  It appears, however, that these 
coveted opportunities may be mutually exclusive.  The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) determined that in order 
for Bloom to compete as a collegiate athlete, he must forfeit his 
modeling and entertainment opportunities.3 
The NCAA was established on March 31, 19064—then called 
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States—in 
 
*  J.D. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003; B.A., University of 
Delaware, 2000. 
1 See Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 11, Bloom v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002) (No. 02-CV-1249) 
[hereinafter Bloom’s Complaint] (on file with the author). 
2 See id. ¶ 15. 
3 See id. ¶ 52. 
4 See Kay Hawes, The NCAA Century Series—Part I: 1900–39: ‘Its Object Shall Be 
Regulation and Supervision: NCAA Born From Need to Bridge Football and Higher 
Education, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/ 
active/3623n27.html. 
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response to increasing safety concerns in the sport of football.5  At 
that time, players did not use the padding and protective equipment 
now standard for the sport.6  Several schools had banned football 
and state legislatures were debating making the sport illegal, but 
few changes to the game were being implemented.7  The 1905 
college football season provided the necessary impetus for 
sweeping change, as it resulted in eighteen deaths and 149 serious 
injuries to student-athletes.8  Representatives from colleges and 
universities agreed to meet and form an association, which then 
made several changes to collegiate football.9  The association 
issued a formal constitution and bylaws on March 31, 1906, upon 
ratification by the then thirty-five member institutions.10  By 1909, 
the association had expanded to sixty-seven member institutions 
and the association changed its name accordingly in 1910 to the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, “to reflect its now truly 
national nature.”11  By 1919, the NCAA was composed of 170 
member institutions and governed eleven different sports.12  
Currently, the NCAA is made up of 1,258 member institutions, 
with a total of approximately 361,175 student-athletes within its 
jurisdiction.13 
As the membership of the NCAA has evolved, so have its 
purposes.  Once enacted for regulating and ensuring the safety of 
football, the NCAA’s purposes have greatly expanded.  The 
current stated goals of the NCAA are to: “Promote student-athletes 
and college sports through public awareness; [p]rotect student-
athletes through standards of fairness and integrity; [p]repare 
student-athletes for lifetime leadership; [and p]rovide student-
 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n [NCAA], Composition of the NCAA, at 
http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/membership_svcs/membership_breakdown.html 
(Mar. 4, 2003). 
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athletes and college sports with the funding to help meet these 
goals.”14 
Approximately fifty years after its original formation, the 1940 
NCAA convention “authorized the NCAA Executive Committee to 
investigate alleged violations of the NCAA’s amateurism 
regulations and to issue interpretations of the NCAA 
constitution.”15  The issue of amateurism, however, has been 
present since the NCAA’s establishment.16  Scholars indicate that 
amateurism’s historical roots can be traced back to Great Britain 
and reflect the socio-economic classes of that time.17  Amateurism 
was associated with the privileged classes—those who engaged in 
sport “purely for enjoyment and to become well-rounded 
gentlemen.”18  The NCAA addressed the notion of amateurism in 
its original 1906 constitution, where eligibility of student-athletes 
was contingent upon the student-athlete having not, at any time, 
received money or other consideration for his or her athletic 
endeavors.19  The eligibility rules at this time, however, operated 
solely on an honor system, since the NCAA had no mechanism for 
enforcing its rules.20 
By the 1900s, the emerging popularity of professional baseball 
inspired the NCAA’s first debate over amateurism.  Many believed 
“that simply by associating with professionals, . . . student-athletes 
had forfeited their amateur status and their college eligibility.”21  
By 1916, the NCAA specifically defined amateurism in its 
bylaws.22  The definition stated, “An amateur athlete is one who 
participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure 
and the physical, mental, moral and social benefits directly derived 
 
14 NCAA, The Purposes of the NCAA, NCAA Online, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/ 
purposes.html (n.d.). 
15 NCAA, Timeline—1940 to 1979, NCAA News, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/ 
19991122/active/3624n27.html (Nov. 22, 1999). 
16 See Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved Over Time, NCAA News, at 
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000103/active/3701n03.html (Jan. 3, 2000). 
17 See id. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. 
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therefrom.”23  National enforcement of the eligibility rules became 
feasible once the NCAA Committee on Infractions was established 
in 1954.24  The rules, however, underwent changes over the next 
twenty years.  The NCAA received a number of requests from 
student-athletes and their schools for waivers to maintain collegiate 
eligibility.25  The waivers were “consistently denied” until the rules 
were modified during the 1974 NCAA Convention.26  These 
changes allowed student-athletes to compete as a professional in 
one sport, while retaining their amateur status in another. 
Article 12 of the NCAA’s bylaws currently governs student-
athlete eligibility as it pertains to amateurism.27  Article 12 states: 
“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate 
athletics participation in a particular sport.”28  Article 12 then 
continues to provide relevant definitions, explaining how an athlete 
may lose his eligibility to play college athletics.29 
Jeremy Bloom’s case presents a clear example of the conflict 
arising between the NCAA’s Amateurism Bylaws (hereinafter 
“Bylaws”),30 their current application, and the NCAA’s stated 
purpose: betterment of its student athletes.  The Bylaws’ effect on 
this exemplary athlete’s career demonstrates that the Bylaws may, 
in many cases, act to the detriment of student-athletes, rather than 
to their benefit. 
This Note contends that the regulations imposed by the NCAA, 
as they relate to its student-athletes’ abilities to garner 
endorsements and sponsorships, should be invalidated.  Part I of 
this Note will trace the decision of the District Court in Boulder 
County, Colorado, refusing to enjoin the NCAA and requiring 
Bloom to choose between collegiate football and his skiing career.  
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12, at 69–83 (2002–03) (setting 
forth the bylaws concerning amateurism for Division I, which is the same for Divisions 
II, & III), http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2002-03/index. 
html. 
28 Id. art. 12.01.1, at 69. 
29 Id. art. 12, at 69–83. 
30 Id. 
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Part II will demonstrate that the NCAA did, in fact, breach its 
contract with its member-institutions as it applies to Bloom.  Part 
III will examine the enforceability of the NCAA’s rules and 
regulations as they apply to an athlete’s right of publicity, 
concluding that these rules are unconscionable.  Part IV will 
demonstrate that the NCAA’s Bylaw 12.5 is an unreasonable 
restraint of trade and should be invalidated.  Part V recommends 
several proposals that could be implemented providing ample 
protection to student-athletes while preserving the amateur 
environment the NCAA wishes to maintain. 
I. BLOOM V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION31 
A. Background 
Bloom was awarded a scholarship to play football for the 
University of Colorado in 2001, but chose to defer his admission to 
prepare for the 2002 Winter Olympics.32  After his success in the 
Games, Bloom sought to pursue his education and his opportunity 
to play football at the University of Colorado, yet declined his 
scholarship.33  The University of Colorado filed an initial waiver34 
in February 2002, announcing its support of Bloom in his 
entertainment and ski-related endeavors.35  This waiver was denied 
by the NCAA.36  Bloom, with the support of University of 
Colorado, then brought suit against the NCAA, seeking an 
injunction which would allow Bloom to play for the University of 
Colorado while continuing to accept his sponsorship money.37  The 
 
31 Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249 (20th Dist. Ct. Colo. 
Aug. 15, 2002). 
32 See Adam Thompson, Bloom Sues NCAA; Skier Wants to Play for Buffs, DENVER 
POST, July 26, 2002, at D-02. 
33 See id. (“[Jeremy] wants to play for the University of Colorado in the fall without a 
scholarship . . . .”). See also Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 17 (“[Jeremy] will receive no financial 
aid from the NCAA . . . or from any other member institution to attend CU.”). 
34 See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 14.12, at 164 (describing the process under which a 
member-institution may appeal when one of their student-athletes is deemed ineligible 
for collegiate competition). 
35 See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 3. 
36 See Thompson, supra note 32. 
37 See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 3–4. 
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complaint contended that the opportunities presented to Bloom had 
nothing to do with his football talents and these opportunities 
preexisted his status as a collegiate athlete.38  As University of 
Colorado’s assistant compliance director, Sherri McKelvey, 
articulated, “[Bloom] has had these offers before he even set foot 
on campus, before he’s caught his first football at [the University 
of Colorado]—even in practice.”39 
B. The Impact of the NCAA’s Bylaws 
1. Ski Endorsements 
The NCAA’s Bylaws mandate that an athlete be an “amateur,” 
and although enforcement of the rules has become more flexible, 
the rules prohibit athletes from being paid to promote commercial 
products or services.40  Athletes have been permitted to maintain 
“amateur” status in one sport while competing professionally in 
another, but they are still bound to abide by the prohibition on 
sponsorship, presenting a problem for those athletes whose 
“secondary” sport is not a traditional professional sport.41 
 The NCAA allows student-athletes to play professional 
sports, even minor-league baseball in the summer and then 
return to their college teams in the fall and spring—as long 
as the only money they accept is from their stated salary. 
 The NCAA has ruled in Bloom’s case that since he 
doesn’t receive a salary, his endorsement deals and prize 
money violate the provision that he can’t make money 
based on his athletic ability.42 
 
38 See id. ¶ 3. 
39 B.G. Brooks, Bloom Wants Ruling: Motion Seeks to Clear Up Eligibility for CU 
Football, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), July 26, 2002, at 1C. 
40 NCAA, supra note 27. See also Hawes, supra note 16. 
41 Thompson, supra note 32 (“[Athletes] may get paid to play professional sports and 
remain eligible for others as amateurs, but cannot sign sponsorship deals that fund 
participation in individual sports, such as freestyle skiing.”). 
42 Shane McCammon, The Straight Line: Trouble with NCAA Unfairly Continues to 
Bloom, Media News,  at http://www.jeremybloom.com/ncaa.htm (July 29, 2002). 
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If he was receiving a salary in a traditional form for his skiing 
career, the NCAA would likely not resist Bloom’s pursuit of both 
professional skiing and collegiate football.43  However, elite-
caliber skiers do not make a traditional salary, but are instead 
compensated in the form of endorsements.44  Moreover, these 
endorsements do not serve as mere compensation, but often enable 
the athlete to continue to participate in the burdensomely 
expensive sport. 
Skiers, who earn little prize money, rely on endorsements 
to finance the high costs of travel and training (up to 
$100,000 a year) that come with elite-level competition . . . 
Bloom must give up a six-figure endorsement income by 
cutting his ties with Oakley, Under Armour and others.  
He’ll now be hard-pressed to fund his 2003 World Cup 
campaign.45 
Bloom, whose success on the ski slopes has earned him 
numerous endorsements, including contracts with Oakley,46 Under 
Armour,47 and Dynastar skis,48 lamented the limitations placed on 
him by the NCAA ruling: “The bottom line is I just want to ski and 
have a shot at Italy in 2006 and play football.  This is about me 
being able to pay for my [ski] season and I can’t do that without 
my endorsements.”49 
 
43 See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.1.2, at 73–74; McCammon, supra note 42. 
44 See John Romano, NCAA Should Make Common Sense an Option, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES (Fla.), Aug. 21, 2002, at 1C (“The only way [Bloom] can financially support his 
skiing career—the cost of equipment, coaching and traveling—is by accepting 
endorsement money.  By denying Bloom the type of earnings made by every Olympic-
caliber skier, the NCAA is essentially threatening his career.”). 
45 Kelley King, Cashing Out; Jeremy Bloom Wanted To Play for Colorado So Badly 
That He Gave Up Lucrative Skiing Endorsements, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 23, 2002, 
at R6. 
46 See http://www.oakley.com (n.d.). 
47 See http://www.underarmour.com (n.d.).  Under Armour is producer of six apparel-
product lines designed to be usable in all climates and weather conditions.  Their first, 
and most popular product, is a lightweight synthetic undershirt, worn under the athlete’s 
uniform and equipment to keep moisture away from the body. Id. 
48 See http://www.dynastar.com (n.d.). 
49 Bruce Feldman, Bloom: I Feel Like I’m Fighting for My Freedom, ESPN: THE 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2002 (alteration in original), http://espn.go.com/ncf/news/2002/0801/ 
1412906.html. 
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2. Entertainment and Modeling Opportunities 
Likewise, the NCAA’s restrictions on association with a 
commercial product will impair Bloom’s ability to continue to 
pursue entertainment and modeling opportunities.  NCAA Bylaw 
12.5.2 prohibits athletes from granting the use of their name and 
likeness for a commercial product, even if the athlete is 
uncompensated.50  For example, the NCAA has previously found 
that an athlete’s allowance of a sorority to use his picture in a 
charity calendar and an athlete taking a part in a movie thriller 
would both violate this Bylaw.51  Bloom was subject to an 
exclusive modeling contract with Tommy Hilfiger, has appeared in 
segments on television shows including EXTRA, Access 
Hollywood, and on the Music Television Station (MTV), and was 
offered a contract to host a show on Nickelodeon.52  According to 
the NCAA’s interpretation of its rules, student-athletes are not 
permitted to pursue these opportunities.  Thus, this prohibition may 
mean that Bloom must permanently forfeit these lucrative 
opportunities.53  As Conan Smith, a William Morris talent agent, 
stated, these limitations would “‘make it virtually impossible [for 
Bloom] to further his career in the television and film industries at 
this time.”54  The entertainment industry is notorious for its 
 
50 See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.5.2, at 81. 
51 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS & THE LAW 734–35 (2d ed. 
1998).  “[I]n 1985, Steve Alford, star guard of Indiana’s NCAA champion basketball 
team . . . , was suspended for one game that season because he had allowed his 
photograph to be included on a calendar that was sold for charity by a school sorority.” 
Id.  The NCAA also determined that Darnell Autry’s acceptance of an offer for a part in a 
supernatural movie thriller would violate “Bylaw 12.5.2.3.4 which states that ‘the 
individual performance of a student-athlete may not be used in a commercial 
movie . . .’.” Id. at 735.  “Before the trial, though, the [NCAA]’s Eligibility Committee 
granted Autry a special waiver on the basis that as a theater major in college, his 
appearance in the film was something that many theater majors might do, and thus not 
related to his athletic ability.” Id. 
52 See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 14. 
53 See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 18. 
54 Jeremy Bloom’s Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for 
Preliminary Injunction at 3, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249 
(20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002). 
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fluctuations in interest.  If Bloom is unable to capitalize on his 
current popularity, his opportunities may be forever forsaken.55 
Bloom may be further harmed considering that while at the 
University of Colorado, he plans to pursue a degree in 
communications.56  The school encourages their students to seek 
“hands-on” opportunities such as those presented to Bloom.  
Stephen B. Jones, Assistant Dean of the School of Journalism and 
Mass Communications at the University of Colorado, explained 
that the school “‘encourage[s] all’ its students ‘to gain professional 
broadcast experience.’”57  Dean Jones explained that the university 
encourages its students to gain media experience and noted that 
such experience is helpful to a student seeking admittance into the 
University of Colorado’s competitive communications program.58  
Dean Jones further stated that media experience, such as the 
Nickelodeon and MTV opportunities presented to Bloom, would 
be advantageous to an individual seeking a career in broadcasting 
upon graduation, concluding that, “[t]he profession will hire the 
recent graduate with experience over other graduates every 
time . . . .”59  While Bloom’s athletic abilities have permitted him 
to fulfill his dream of playing collegiate football, the NCAA’s 
restrictions are unfairly impairing his ability to make the most of 
his education and fulfill his ultimate career. 
Furthermore, Bloom’s status as a communications major 
should have enabled him to prove his broadcasting abilities.  By 
analogy, Darnell Autry, a Northwestern football player and theater 
major was permitted to accept a part in a commercial movie.60  
Darnell Autry was a star running back, Heisman finalist, and 
theater major at Northwestern University.61  In 1996, Autry sued 
the NCAA to allow him to accept “a small speaking role in ‘The 
Eighteenth Angel,’ a supernatural thriller being filmed in Italy,” 
 
55 See id. at 5–6 (Entertainment and modeling opportunities “occur but once in a 
lifetime, with nothing to suggest they will be available four (or five) years from now.”). 
56 See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 41. 
57 Id. (alteration in original). 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51. 
61 See Andrew Fegelman, Judge’s Restraining Order Still Doesn’t Solve Autry’s 
Problem, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1996, at 3N. 
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while maintaining his eligibility to play football.62  Autry was 
offered the part after the director saw him on television, and noted 
the student-athlete’s “poise, presence, projection[,] and 
demeanor.”63  The only compensation Autry was to receive would 
be that necessary to cover his expenses.64  Further, the director 
promised that the role would not include any football-related 
performances by Autry, the student would not appear as an athlete 
in the movie, and he would not be used to promote the film.65  The 
Illinois District Court granted a temporary restraining order against 
the NCAA, enjoining it from precluding Autry’s performance in 
the film.66 
Similarly, the broadcasting and modeling opportunities 
presented to Bloom would not involve his performing as a football 
athlete.  In fact, these opportunities were a direct result of his 
skiing success and not football.  Moreover, Bloom seeks to retain 
his amateur status in football.  The triggering force for the offer 
should not be problematic as long as the opportunities do not arise 
from his success on the football field.  These opportunities may be 
distinguished from his participation on the University of Colorado 
football team.  As Bloom has indicated, however, these 
impediments are minor, he simply wants to continue to ski for his 
country and play football for the University of Colorado.67 
C. The Court Decision 
While expressing his disappointment with the NCAA and his 
sympathy for Bloom, Judge Hale, the presiding Boulder County 
District Court judge, rejected Bloom’s motion for injunctive relief, 
 
62 Mark Brown, Autry Sues NCAA Over Film Role, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at 
108. 
63 Id. 
64 See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249, slip op. at 5 (20th 
Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002); Brown, supra note 62. 
65 See Brown, supra note 62. 
66 See Jeremy Bloom’s Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for 
Preliminary Injunction at 11, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249 
(20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002) (citing Autry v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 
96CH3275 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Apr. 3, 1996)) (on file with the author). 
67 See Feldman, supra note 49. 
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upholding the NCAA ruling.68  Recognizing the NCAA’s authority 
regarding this matter, Judge Hale nevertheless expressed his 
opinion that this was an unreasonable result: 
 Here the NCAA had an opportunity to recognize and 
support a World Cup champion and an Olympic competitor 
by supporting his future success—by leaving doors open 
rather than closing them. . . .  Mr. Bloom is truly an 
amateur athlete in football with only dreams of even 
receiving playing time . . . .  [T]he NCAA is missing an 
opportunity to promote amateurism on the one hand, and 
the opportunity to support the personal and football [and] 
non-athletic growth of a student athlete on the other. 
 Mr. Bloom is the epitome of an amateur who wishes to 
live out his dream of playing college football for [the 
University of Colorado] without abandoning the once-in-a-
lifetime future opportunities he has.  I would like to [see 
him] live out those dreams.  I would like to be able to find a 
legal basis for me to be able to enjoin the NCAA.  
However, I cannot find a sound legal basis that would 
allow me to [do so].69 
In refusing to grant an injunction against the NCAA, Judge 
Hale held that the rules were rationally related to the NCAA’s 
stated purposes and that they were not arbitrarily or capriciously 
applied.70 
First, Judge Hale determined that student athletes, specifically 
Jeremy Bloom, are third party beneficiaries in the existing contract 
 
68 See Bloom, slip op. at 7 (“Although the administrative process relating to this rule 
could have, and I think should have, allowed an accommodation to be reached as to Mr. 
Bloom’s interest and the interest of the NCAA, the failure to do so was not arbitrary and 
capricious.”). 
69 Id. 
70 See id.  Courts generally exert deference to the NCAA’s rules and administrative 
decisions. See, e.g., Wiley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 612 F.2d 473, 479 (10th 
Cir. 1978) (“[C]onstitutional analysis requires broad discretion be given to the NCAA 
eligibility rules.  But even applying a minimal test of rationality the NCAA’s rule . . . 
fails.”) (citation omitted). 
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between the NCAA and its member collegiate institutions.71  
Applying the criteria set forth in R.N. Robinson and Sons v. 
Ground Improvement Techniques,72 the judge found that “the 
NCAA and its members intended to benefit the person not a party 
to the contract and that the benefit is direct and not merely 
incidental to the contract . . . .  The ways in which the contract 
benefits student athletes are too numerous to mention.”73  The 
bylaws constituting part of the contract were, in fact, enacted 
primarily for the benefit of students.74 
Judge Hale then found that without the injunction, Bloom 
would be subject to immediate and irreparable harm with no 
adequate legal remedy.75  In addition, preserving the status quo 
would protect Bloom’s existing rights and the remedies that he 
seeks.76  The judge, however, did not find that Bloom had a 
probability of success on the merits of his case.77  To succeed in 
his motion for injunctive relief, Bloom was required to 
demonstrate that the “NCAA had breached the contract, that the 
bylaws were arbitrary and capricious or in violation of public 
policy, or that the bylaws were applied in an unfair, arbitrary or 
 
71 Bloom, slip op. at 2.  The NCAA conceded that this contract resulted from its 
constitution and bylaws. Id. 
72 31 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D. Colo. 1998) (“[A] third party beneficiary . . . may have a 
right to sue on the contract where ‘(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances 
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised 
performance.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981))). 
73 Bloom, slip op. at 2. 
74 Id. 
[The] series of by-laws is almost solely for the benefit of the student athlete as 
it relates to a primary purpose of the contract—the education of student 
athletes.  Additionally the by-laws restrict the use of agents and prohibit 
compensation for participation in college sports.  One benefit is to foster 
amateurism.  The other is a direct benefit to student athletes which is to avoid 
their being exploited. 
Id. 
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id. (“[W]ithout the injunctive relief requested Mr. Bloom will lose an opportunity to 
defend his world cup title in free style mogul skiing.  He will be unable to obtain the 
customary income from professional skiing necessary to allow for activities such as 
coaching and other expenses to allow for a defense of his title.”). 
77 Id. at 3–4. 
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capricious manner.”78  The judge found that Bloom failed on this 
account, specifically noting the NCAA’s legitimate purpose of 
fostering amateurism in collegiate sports and that the implemented 
Bylaws were rationally related to the NCAA’s mission of 
distinguishing collegiate athletics from professional sports.79 
Further, the judge determined that the NCAA was not applying 
its rules in an arbitrary or capricious manner.  The judge noted that 
there were differences between the pursuit of a professional career 
as a skier as opposed to a baseball player, and the difference 
between these salary structures justifies different treatment.80  
Judge Hale noted that while some athletes would use the 
sponsorship pay to fund their athletic endeavors, others would 
simply take it as a profit: 
 If Mr. Bloom was allowed to receive the income that is 
customary for professional skiers, it is not difficult to 
imagine that some in other professional sports would 
decide that in addition to direct monetary compensation, 
that endorsements or promotion of goods would become 
“customary.”  Therefore, I find a rational basis for the 
bylaw and its interpretation.81 
Under similar reasoning, Judge Hale found that the NCAA’s 
prohibition on Bloom continuing his Tommy Hilfiger modeling 
contract was also rational.  The judge observed that the NCAA 
expressed a reasonable fear that the personal appearances required 
of Bloom under his contract could utilize his football ability: 
 If those at a Tommy Hilfiger promotion recognized or 
learned that Mr. Bloom was a [University of Colorado] 
football player and began discussing a dazzling punt return 
he made for [a] touchdown with him, it is inconceivable 
that this polite young man could reasonably be expected to 
ignore the conversation.  It would be a conversation about 
his athleticism in football.  Even if Mr. Bloom had no 
intent to endorse or promote Tommy Hilfiger clothing, that 
 
78 Id. at 4. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 5. 
81 Id. 
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would be a practical effect of his presence at the 
promotion.82 
Judge Hale also disagreed with Bloom’s argument that the 
NCAA and its member institutions’ advertising and promotion 
policy contravenes their stated purpose, because the policy does in 
fact benefit the sports programs and “each student athlete at the 
institution.”83  Further, the judge distinguished NCAA’s waiver of 
Bylaw 12.5.2.3.4 for Darrell Autry from the NCAA’s refusal to 
grant permission to Bloom.84 
Judge Hale concluded that Bloom was unable to demonstrate 
his likelihood of success and refused to issue the injunction.  
Jeremy Bloom thus “faced a choice.  Give up a life-long dream of 
college football or give up hundreds of thousands of dollars and, 
quite possibly, a chance at returning to the Olympics in 2006.  
Bloom chose football.”85 
While Bloom enjoyed success in his freshman season at the 
University of Colorado, he remains forced to contemplate the 
wisdom of his decision.86  In a recent interview, Bloom was asked 
whether he planned on playing another three years of college 
football, to which he responded: 
 I’m not sure right now.  I’m just taking everything a day 
at a time and after ski season I will think about if I will 
come back next year or not.  The NCAA makes it really 
 
82 Id. at 6. 
83 Id. at 5. 
84 Id.  The court noted: 
Autry was a drama major well into his course of study; Autry was not being 
compensated for appearing in the film; Autry had a defined and very small role 
in the film; and the other actors had an international reputation which 
demonstrated that the appearance of Autry in the film was not designed to 
impact the popularity of the film.  On the other hand, Mr. Bloom would be the 
focus, the star, of any MTV or Nickelodeon show and would be compensated. 
Id. 
85 Romano, supra note 44. 
86 In the Big 12 Championship Game, while losing to the University of Oklahoma, 
Bloom made an 80-yard punt return, setting a Big 12 record.  Bloom was also voted by 
the Colorado Hall of Fame Committee as the “Colorado Amateur Athlete of the Year.” 
See http://www.jeremybloom.com/index1.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002); University of 
Colorado, Oklahoma vs. Colorado (Dec. 7, 2002), at http://cubuffs.ocsn.com/sports/m-
footbl/stats/120702aaa.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003). 
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hard for me to be able to do both sports so at some point I 
will have to choose.87 
Bloom chose to play football rather than cash in on the 
lucrative opportunities presented to him, but the NCAA unfairly 
presented him with a choice that he never should have been forced 
to make. 
II. THE CONTRACT—NCAA CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS 
A. NCAA Constitution and the Bylaws 
The NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws constitute a contract 
between the NCAA and its member colleges.88  Article I of the 
NCAA Constitution sets forth its fundamental purposes.89  Article 
1.3 states the NCAA’s “Fundamental Policy,” indicating that its 
basic purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral 
part of the educational program . . . and . . . retain a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”90  The constitution establishes obligations for its member 
institutions.91  Article 2.2 delegates the responsibility to member 
institutions to ensure that they “maintain an environment in which 
a student-athlete’s activities are conducted as an integral part of the 
student-athlete’s educational experience.”92  Bylaw 12 states that 
only amateur athletes are eligible to participate in NCAA 
intercollegiate athletics.93  Bylaw 12 also establishes the numerous 
ways in which an athlete may lose their amateur status, describing 
 
87 Interview with Jeremy Bloom (Dec. 8, 2002), at http://www.geocities.com/ 
jellyqueens/jeremy/images/inter/inter.htm. See also Sam Adams, Upchurch Honored to 
Join Class of 2003, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), Dec. 4, 2002. 
88 See Bloom, slip op. at 2 (“The NCAA has conceded its Constitution and By-Laws 
constitute a contract between it and its members which number approximately 1,267.”). 
89 NCAA, supra note 27, art. 1, at 1. 
90 See id. art. 1, 1.3.1, at 1. 
91 See id. art. 1, 1.3.2, at 1 (“Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and 
enforce this legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be 
applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.”). 
92 Id. art. 2.2.1, at 3. 
93 See id., art. 12.01.1, at 69. 
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prohibited forms of payment to student-athletes.94  Importantly, 
Bylaw 12.5.1.1 provides that a member institution may grant 
permission to entities to utilize student-athletes’ names, pictures, or 
appearances if all monies derived therefrom go to the member 
institution; otherwise, no form of the athlete’s identity may be 
associated with any commercial product or branding.95 
B. Athletes As Third-Party Beneficiaries 
Judge Hale determined that Bloom was a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract between the NCAA and the University 
of Colorado.96  A third-party beneficiary is one who receives the 
benefit of two contracting parties’ exchange of promises.97  A 
typical third-party beneficiary contract exists when the promisor’s 
interest in the third party is limited to the promisor’s performance 
of its promise to the third party.98 
[O]ne does not qualify as a third-party beneficiary of a 
contract merely because one is an incidental beneficiary of 
the performance of a contract or because the promisor had a 
general desire to advance the interests of a third party. . . . 
“[T]he key is not whether the contracting parties had an 
altruistic motive or desire to benefit the third party, but 
rather ‘whether performance under the contract would 
necessarily and directly benefit’ that party.”99 
The contract formed by the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws is 
between the NCAA and its member institutions.  The contract 
establishes the rules and conditions to which student-athletes must 
adhere in order to retain their eligibility and participate in NCAA 
 
94 See id. art. 12, at 69–83. 
95 See id. art. 12.5.1.1, 12.5.1.1(c), (e), (g), at 78. 
96 See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249, slip op. at 2 (20th 
Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002). 
97 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[If] A 
promises to pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C, the 
person who receives the benefit of the exchange promises between the two others (C) is 
called a third-party beneficiary.”). 
98 See, e.g., Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 495 (1960). 
99 Hairston v. Pac.-10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1485, 1494 (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
(quoting Postlewait Constr. v. Great Am. Ins., 720 P.2d 805, 806–07 (Wash. 1986) 
(quoting Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 662 P.2d 385, 390 (Wash. 1983))). 
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competitions.100  While student-athletes do not directly enter into 
this contract, they may nonetheless be considered a party to the 
agreement.101  Student-athletes are not merely affected by the 
contractual performance of the two parties, but directly benefit 
from the existing contract.  As Judge Hale indicated: “[T]his series 
of by-laws is almost solely for the benefit of the student[-]athlete 
as it relates to the primary purpose of the contract—the education 
of student[-]athletes.”102  Further, even the amateurism rules, while 
enacted to foster amateurism itself, also have “direct benefit to 
student athletes which is to avoid their being exploited.”103  Thus, 
the contract’s goal is to benefit the student-athlete, as third-party 
beneficiaries.  Therefore, Bloom is a third party beneficiary to the 
contract between the NCAA and the University of Colorado. 
C. Breach 
Bloom, as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the 
NCAA and the University of Colorado, has proper standing to 
bring legal action against the NCAA and the University of 
Colorado for those injuries he sustained as a result of those parties’ 
breach of contract.  A third-party beneficiary has standing to sue a 
party in privity to a contract for that party’s breach of the contract, 
to the extent that the breach has infringed upon the rights assigned 
to the beneficiary.104  The NCAA’s refusal to allow Bloom to 
capitalize upon his professional opportunities constitutes a breach 
of contract.  The NCAA’s stated purpose and underlying rationale 
for all of their rules and regulations is to enhance the educational 
experience of the student-athlete.105 
 
100 See Bloom, slip op. at 4. 
101 Id. at 2. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. See also Hall v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 985 F. Supp. 782, 797 n.32 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997) (“NCAA members, pursuant to the constitution, bylaws and regulations, all 
agree that students will not be allowed to play intercollegiate sports unless they meet 
NCAA criteria.  . . . [T]he intent of the NCAA and its members in evaluating incoming 
student athletes . . . is to specifically protect entering student athletes . . . .”). 
104 See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) (finding that a third party 
beneficiary has a right to bring action under a contract upon a showing that the promisor 
(member institutions) understood the promisee’s (NCAA’s) intent to benefit that 
individual). 
105 See NCAA, supra note 14. 
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Rather than enhance Bloom’s educational experience at the 
University of Colorado, however, the NCAA hampered it.  As 
previously stated, many of the opportunities  presented to Bloom, 
specifically the broadcasting opportunities, would have 
supplemented the communications major’s education.106  The 
NCAA’s expressed concern is that the companies approaching 
Bloom with lucrative offers may exploit him.  Bloom’s 
professional career predates  his matriculation at the University of 
Colorado.  Thus, it is unlikely that Bloom would suddenly become 
exploited as an NCAA athlete.  The restriction did not serve to 
protect Bloom, but rather thwarted viable opportunities.  This may 
constitute a breach of the NCAA’s promise to protect the student-
athlete and enrich his education.  To the extent that the NCAA’s 
enforcement of its amateurism rules has impeded Bloom’s ability 
to enhance his collegiate education, the NCAA breached its 
contract with the University of Colorado.  Bloom, a student-athlete 
and third-party beneficiary to the contract, has standing to sue 
based on that breach. 
III. ATHLETE LIKENESS AND COLLEGE PROFITS 
As previously noted, an athlete must agree to abide by all of 
the NCAA’s rules and regulations before he or she can compete.107  
This provision results in depriving athletes of their ability to 
capitalize upon their right of publicity.  The right of publicity is the 
right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her 
identity.108  The underlying rationale is that an individual’s identity 
inherently belongs to him or her and that only he or she should be 
able to exploit that identity so as to not provide unjust enrichment 
to another.109  Here, Bloom only hopes to exploit his identity to 
 
106 See supra Part I.B.2. 
107 In accordance with Bylaw 14.01.3.1, a student-athlete’s eligibility hinges on the 
individual adhering to the amateurism regulations set forth in Bylaw 12. NCAA, supra 
note 27, arts. 14.01.3.1, at 125.  Bylaw 12.1.1 describes those situations in which an 
athlete would lose her amateur status. Id. art. 12.1.1, at 70–74. 
108 See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 313–16 (1999). 
109 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15–16 (4th ed. 1998) (“[E]very 
man has a property in his own person.  This nobody has any right to but himself.  The 
labor of his body, and the work of his hands . . . are properly his.” (paraphrasing JOHN 
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sustain himself in elite skiing.  Moreover, while the NCAA rules 
are not only limiting his ability to exercise this right, the NCAA 
and the University of Colorado are using his identity for their own 
benefit.  The rules providing for this assignment of the athletes’ 
rights of publicity are unconscionable, and should therefore be 
invalidated. 
A. The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is rooted in the right to privacy, a right 
“that allowed people to block the use of their name and likeness in 
advertisements without their consent.”110  Judge Jerome Frank, in 
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum,111 recognized that an 
individual’s identity was a common law property right with a 
commercial value completely independent of privacy concerns.112 
This right might be called a “right of publicity.”  For it is 
common knowledge that many prominent persons 
(especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their 
feelings bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements, 
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, 
magazines, busses, trains and subways.  This right of 
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it 
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which 
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.113 
The right of publicity is most often associated with the 
commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition takes an expansive 
view of the right, defining the right of publicity as the 
appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s identity by 
using without consent the person’s name, likeness or other indicia 
 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 2, ch. 5 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690))). 
110 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 422. 
111 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
112 See id. at 868. 
113 Id. 
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of identity for purposes of trade.”114  The latter part of this 
definition, the “other indicia of identity,” has allowed for 
protection of various characteristics of an individual.  Viable 
publicity claims may be based on the misappropriation of an 
individual’s likeness,115 voice,116 running style,117 an athlete’s 
specialized shot or technique,118 and depictions of objects 
associated with the individual.119 
Bloom is prevented from exploiting any attributes of his name 
or identifiable persona and from using his publicity rights to create 
an association with commercial brands or products.120  The same 
rule that prevents Bloom from usurping value from his name, 
however, allows the NCAA, and specifically, the University of 
Colorado, to exploit his personal characteristics to reap a profit.121 
A. Collegiate Usage of Athlete’s Name and Likeness 
An estimate in the late 1980s found that “each additional 
victory in football earned the school $300,000, and in men’s 
basketball $45,000. . . . Patrick Ewing is estimated to have 
 
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
115 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding a violation of 
Muhammad Ali’s right of publicity for a portrait in Playgirl magazine in which the 
drawing clearly had a resemblance to Ali and included a reference to the drawing as 
being “The Greatest”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(identifying a potential publicity claim for Vanna White for Samsung’s use of a robot 
dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry reminiscent of White). 
116 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding Bette 
Midler’s voice is distinctive and personal, an attribute of Midler’s identity that may be 
protected from commercial exploitation). 
117 See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson, 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (holding that 
defendant-company’s use of the name “Crazylegs” to market their shaving gel constituted 
an infringement of Hirsh’s right of publicity since Elroy Hirsch’s distinctive running style 
led to him being known as “Crazylegs”). 
118 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 844 (2d ed. 2000) (identifying moves such as “Monica Seles’ two-
handed backhand shot in tennis; Bob Cousy’s behind the back basketball pass; [and] Pete 
Rose’s headfirst baseball slide” may be protectable attributes of the athletes’ rights of 
publicity). 
119 See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(finding that a company that used a car for commercial use, which was reflective of 
famous race-car driver’s distinctive car, infringed the driver’s right of publicity). 
120 See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.5.1.1(g), at 78. 
121 See id., art. 12.5.1.1(e), at 78. 
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generated $12 million in additional revenues for Georgetown 
during his four years there in the early 1980s, when overall college 
basketball revenues were significantly lower than they are 
today.”122  Recent years have displayed a demonstrative increase in 
the amount of revenues generated for NCAA member institutions 
from television and sponsorship contracts.123  Notably, the above 
stated figures, attributing revenue to individual players, were 
calculated before these types of lucrative contracts became the 
norm. 
In 1999, the NCAA and CBS signed a contract in the 
amount of $6.3 billion ($6,300,000,000.00) for the rights to 
televise certain basketball performances of NCAA student-
athletes, just 63 games annually.  In 2000, ABC signed a 
contract for $400 million ($400,000,000.00) for rights to 
televise the football performances of NCAA student-
athletes in the Bowl Championship Series . . . .  Fox Sports 
Network has agreed to pay $220 million ($220,000,000.00) 
to televise the football performance of NCAA student-
athletes in games involving the Big Twelve Conference 
alone [(of which the University of Colorado is a member)]. 
 . . . On June 12, 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported 
that Coca-Cola Company entered an agreement with the 
NCAA and CBS valued at $500 million ($500,000,000) 
whereby Coca-Cola purchased the rights to promote its 
products in connection with the performance of student-
athletes at NCAA championship events.124 
Moreover, “[u]niversities take commercial advantage of the 
popularity of college athletics through the merchandising and 
 
122 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 796 (emphasis added). 
123 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 769. 
124 Bloom’s Complaint ¶¶ 24–25 (citing Betsy McKay, Coke Beats Pepsi for NCAA 
Rights in Deal That Tops $500 Million, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at B3). See also 
News Release, NCAA, NCAA Reaches Rights Agreement with CBS Sports (Nov. 18, 
1999), http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepager.cgi/champother/1999111801co.htm; 
News Release, NCAA, Coke Signs “Corporate Champion” Pact (June 24, 2002), 
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/20020624/awide/3913n16.html. 
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licensing of college merchandise.”125  While restricting an athlete’s 
ability to grant commercial usage of his or her name and likeness, 
“the NCAA does not restrict the use of a college athlete’s likeness 
by the universities themselves.”126  Revenue generated from the 
sales of college merchandise and royalties earned from the 
licensing thereof produces multi-million dollar profits for schools. 
In the early 1980s, the total retail market for products 
identified with college athletics was under $100 million a 
year, most of which was sold in college book stores or 
other outlets on campus.  By the mid-1990s, the college 
market was over $2.5 billion a year, the vast bulk sold in 
retail stores and chains.  The average royalty rates of 
around eight percent earned some 20 schools more than a 
million dollars per year.127 
The amateurism rules allow schools to profit by using athletes’ 
identities, but prohibit athletes from receiving any compensation 
for their own name and likeness.  The NCAA has considered 
proposals to cure this inequity, though none would alleviate the 
problems the Bylaws present to Bloom and other extraordinary 
student-athletes like him. 
Schools are able to capitalize on athletes’ identities, because 
they can compete as NCAA athletes.  Bylaw 14.01.3.1 states that 
student-athletes must abide by the NCAA’s regulations to retain 
their eligibility.128  Bylaw 12.5.1.1 grants universities permission 
to commercially utilize a student-athlete’s name, likeness, and 
identity.129  Thus, in order to abide by the NCAA rules and 
regulations, an athlete must grant his or her school a license to use 
his or her name and likeness (his or her right of publicity) for the 
school’s own commercial gain.  These provisions of the NCAA 
contract are unconscionable and should be invalidated. 
 
125 Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating 
the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 153 (1996). 
126 James S. Thompson, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes Enjoy a 
Common Law Right to Publicity?, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 143, 167 (1994) (citing a 
letter to James S. Thompson from Richard D. Schultz, Executive Director of the NCAA). 
127 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 769. 
128 NCAA, supra note 27, art. 14.01.3.1, at 125. 
129 Id. at 78–79. 
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B. Unconscionability 
A court may invalidate a contract if it is deemed 
unconscionable.130  Unconscionability exists within a contract 
where its terms are so unfair that they “shock the conscience.”131  
The traditional rule was that a contract was unconscionable if it 
was “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would 
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept 
on the other.”132  In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,133 
the court recognized that unconscionability included the absence of 
a meaningful choice on the part of one party, coupled with 
“contract terms [that] are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party.”134  The court further noted that “when a party of little 
bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract 
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his 
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was 
ever given to all the terms.”135 
Commentators have identified two different types of 
unconscionability: procedural and substantive.136  Procedural 
unconscionability results from unfairness within the bargaining 
process.137  If one party to the contract effectively has no choice 
but to agree to the terms of the contract, this indicates a defect in 
the negotiation process, which may result in procedural 
unconscionability.  Substantive unconscionability, however, 
focuses on the terms of the contract itself.  If the contract terms are 
unreasonable, and so one-sided that they “shock the conscience,” 
the contract may be substantively unconscionable.138 
In order to participate in intercollegiate competition, an athlete 
must agree to abide by all of the NCAA’s rules and regulations, 
 
130 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (allowing a court to refuse to enforce a contract, which it 
deems was unconscionable when the contract was effectuated). 
131 Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2002). 
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
133 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
134 Id. at 449. 
135 Id. 
136 CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
675 (4th ed. 1999). 
137 Id. 
138 Am. Software v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
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“including those which permit the universities to use the likeness 
of college athletes for commercial purposes.”139  Athletes who 
wish to compete at the collegiate level have no alternative but to 
agree to the stipulated provisions, and as a result they are left with 
“no meaningful choice.”140  High-school-aged athletes must either 
agree to the terms, most of which they are likely unable to truly 
understand, or loose their collegiate eligibility.  In the end, these 
young adults do not have a choice.  Moreover, the contract terms 
themselves are unjust.  The forced forfeiture of rights combined 
with the compulsory assignment of athletes’ right of publicity is 
unconscionable and should be invalidated. 
IV. NCAA BYLAW 12.5 CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act 
The Sherman Antitrust Act (hereinafter the “Act”)141 prohibits 
unreasonable restraints of trade.142  The seminal case analyzing 
NCAA practices under antitrust law is National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.143  In 
Board of Regents, the Supreme Court analyzed the NCAA’s 
television plan and found that the “challenged practices of the 
NCAA constitute a ‘restraint of trade’ in the sense that they limit 
members’ freedom to negotiate and enter into their own television 
contracts.”144  The Court recognized, however, that the Act only 
prohibits those restraints of trade that are unreasonable.145 
 
139 Thompson, supra note 126, at 176. 
140 Walker, 35 F.2d at 450.  See also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 750 (“All 
colleges with major athletic programs are members of the NCAA, and they have all 
agreed to abide by the NCAA’s rules and not to play against any school the Association 
declares ineligible.”). 
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
142 See id.  “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or commerce among the 
several states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal.” Id. § 1. 
143 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
144 Id. at 98. 
145 See id. at 98–99. 
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A conclusion that a restraint of trade is unreasonable may 
be “based either (1) on the nature or character of the 
contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise 
to the inference or presumption that they were intended to 
restrain trade and enhance prices.  Under either branch of 
the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of the 
impact on competitive conditions.”146 
The validity of a regulation potentially restraining trade will be 
determined by evaluating its impact on competition.147  Bylaw 
12.5.1,148 the rule prohibiting athletes from associating with for-
profit entities while allowing schools to profit from using their 
athletes’ name, likeness, or identity, is anticompetitive and should 
be invalidated under the Act. 
A. Antitrust Scrutiny of the NCAA’s Amateurism Bylaws 
Most courts examining a challenge to the NCAA’s Amateurism 
Bylaws have determined that the Bylaws fulfill a legitimate 
business purpose,149 and in fact have procompetitive effects.150  
However, these cases have focused on the “no-agent” and “no-
draft” rules.151  While it has been stated that “[t]he overriding 
purpose of the eligibility Bylaws . . . is not to provide the NCAA 
with commercial advantage, but rather the opposite extreme—to 
prevent commercializing influences from destroying the unique 
‘product’ of NCAA college football[,]”152 this rationale may not be 
applicable when analyzing the amateurism rules from the 
 
146 Id. at 103 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 
(1978)). 
147 See id. 
148 NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.5.1, at 78–81. 
149 See, e.g., Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990) (stating that the NCAA’s regulations are designed to “maintain amateur 
intercollegiate athletics ‘as an integral part of the educational program . . .’” (quoting 
NCAA, supra note 14)). 
150 See, e.g., id. at 746 (finding that the NCAA’s amateurism rules “have primarily 
procompetitive effects in that they promote the integrity and quality of college football 
and preserve the distinct ‘product’ of major college football as an amateur sport”). 
151 See, e.g., Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
152 Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744. 
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viewpoint of their restrictions on athlete endorsements or 
sponsorships. 
1. College Athletics: Truly Amateur Sport? 
College athletics is a commercialized industry.  The NCAA’s 
own efforts have demonstrated this with its multi-million dollar 
television and merchandising contracts.153  To view collegiate 
sports as “an institution of amateurism” would ignore this fact, and 
would indeed be “misguided.”154  NCAA colleges and universities 
reap tremendous financial benefits from their star athletes.155  A 
star athlete may give the school increased name recognition, 
greater airtime on television, and success for the school both on 
and off the field.  One star athlete could allow the school to enjoy 
greater success in the sports season, which makes future 
recruitment of other talented student-athletes easier.  The increased 
presence that accompanies a successful sports season can result in 
an increase in applications, strengthening the quality of student the 
school itself attracts.156  Most importantly, however, a star athlete 
and/or a successful season greatly increases the revenue earned by 
the school. 
This phenomenon is best demonstrated by looking at a specific 
example.  In the past several years, the University of Maryland 
(hereinafter “Maryland”), a large Division I school, has enjoyed 
considerable athletic success.157  Coincidentally, the school has 
also seen an increase in enrollment applications, a higher quality of 
student, and an increase in revenue within that same time period.158 
 
153 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
154 Belo, supra note 125, at 153. 
155 See generally supra Part III.B. 
156 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 796 (noting that in his four years at 
Georgetown, Patrick Ewing helped generate a forty-seven percent increase in 
applications and a forty point rise in its freshman SAT scores). 
157 See infra Tables 1, 2. 
158 See infra Tables 2, 3. But see Sarah Talalay, Football Success Pays Off for UM; 
Campus Basks in Prestige, Enjoys Added Revenue, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 
29, 2002, at 1A (quoting University of Maryland [hereinafter Maryland] officials who 
asserted that donations fell in 2002 after years of continued growth and that the number 
of applications received by Maryland had already been increasing prior to the success 
within the Maryland athletic program). 
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The following tables depict the evolution of Maryland’s 
football and basketball teams, and track revenue and admission 
statistic changes. 
 
Table 1 
University of Maryland Football and Basketball Season Records159 
Football Basketball 
School Year Record Post-Season Result 
(if any) 
Record Post-Season 
Resulta (if any) 
1998–1999 3-8  26-6 Sweet Sixteen 
1999–2000 5-6  25-10 Second Round 
2000–2001 5-6  25-11 Final Four 
2001–2002 10-2  Orange Bowl 32-4 National Champions 
a These results indicate the NCAA Division I Basketball Tournament round in which 
the Maryland men’s basketball team lost. 
 
Table 2 
University of Maryland Budgeted Sports-Related Revenue160 
Fiscal 
Year 
Sales & Services of 
Auxiliary Enterprisesa ($) 
Private Gifts, Grants & 
Contractsb ($) 
Total Revenue 
($) 
1999 137,348,686 41,321,284 836,612,738 
2000 127,720,172 43,222,186 904,347,659 
2001 135,546,500 41,744,722 960,586,972 
2002 151,388,065 54,687,507 1,028,517,530 
 
159 See University of Maryland Football Game Results, TerrapinStats.com, at 
http://www.terrapinstats.com/football.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2003); University of 
Maryland Basketball Stats, Terrapin Stats.com, at http://www.terrapinstats.com/ 
basketball.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2003). 
160 See Telephone Interview with Blene Mekbeb, Fiscal Management Specialist, Dept. 
of Budget and Fiscal Analysis, University of Maryland (Jan. 28, 2003); Dept. of Budget 
& Fiscal Analysis, Budget Information, University of Maryland, at 
http://www.inform.umd.edu/CampusInfo/Departments/BFA/budgetinfo3.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2003). 
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2003 147,352,979 52,803,238 1,155,364,083 
a Auxiliary Enterprises revenue constituted 13–16% of the total revenue budgeted, 
and includes the University Bookstore, where most of the school-licensed memorabilia is 
sold on campus.  Additional licensing revenue is also placed under this subsection. 
b Private Gifts comprised approximately 5% of the total revenue budgeted, and 
consists mainly of donations made to the school, private grants, and alumni contributions. 
 
Table 3 
University of Maryland Admissions Data161  
First Year 
Classa 
Total 
Applications 
Acceptance 
Rate (%) 
Average 
GPAb 
SAT Rangec 
1999 18,807 54.5 3.61 1150–1320 
2000 18,525 50.6 3.72 1170–1330 
2001 19,668 55.0 3.76 1170–1330 
2002 23,141 43.5 3.86 1200–1350 
a The year listed indicates year of matriculation. 
b Average high school grade point average. 
c  Range of Scholastic Aptitude Test scores from the twenty-fifth to seventy-fifth 
percentiles. 
As of 1985, Maryland boasted a number-one-ranked football 
team and a top-rated basketball team led by a young, upcoming 
star, Len Bias.162  By 1990, however, commentators had criticized 
Maryland as having hit “rock bottom.”163  Bias died of a cocaine 
overdose in June of 1986, and following recruiting violations and 
an NCAA determination of a “lack of institutional control,” 
Maryland was subject to severe and controversial NCAA 
sanctions.164  As a result, the Maryland men’s basketball team was 
 
161 See Office of Institutional Research & Planning, Quick Summary Data, University of 
Maryland, at http://www.inform.umd.edu/OIS/quicksum.html (last visited Mar. 31, 
2003). 
162 See Michael Wilbon, This Decision Has No Appeal, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1990, at 
B1. 
163 See, e.g., id. 
164 See  Jonathan Feigen, Restore The Roar; Maryland Revives Program With Help of 
Home-Grown Talent, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 21, 1995, at 2 (describing sanctions 
imposed on the program after the death of Len Bias and the programs subsequent 
rebuilding process); Phil Hersh, ‘Seeing Superman Go Bad’: Their Records Set, for Many 
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placed on probation for three years, was precluded from postseason 
competition through the 1991–92 season, and was prohibited from 
appearing on live television, effectively barring Maryland from 
competing in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) tournament 
during those years.165  Furthermore, Maryland was required to 
return $400,000 it had received in NCAA Division I Basketball 
Tournament (hereinafter “Tournament”) revenue to the NCAA.  
The NCAA deleted the Maryland men’s basketball team’s record 
from the 1988 Tournament.166 
From the 1999 to 2002 Maryland football seasons, the team 
improved its overall record from an abominable 3-8 to a 10-2 
record, including an appearance at Maryland’s first major bowl 
game in over twenty years, followed by a win at the Peach Bowl in 
2003.167  The Maryland Terrapins’ Peach Bowl win marked 
Maryland’s second eleven-win season in the 110 years of 
Maryland football.168 
During the same time period, the basketball team dramatically 
improved their record, made Maryland’s first appearance in the 
NCAA National Tournament Final Four, and won Maryland’s first 
national basketball championship.169  During the same period, 
Maryland’s revenue increased a total of $318,751,345.170  In 
particular, the categories of revenue representing sales of Maryland 
memorabilia and licensing, and private donations increased a total 
 
the Records Turned Criminal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1986, at 1C; John Nelson, Year in 
Review: 1986; Deaths of Bias, Rogers Overshadow Sport Achievements, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 1986, § 3, at 1. 
165 See Maryland Nailed with a Two-Year Post-Season Ban, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 
1990, at B5. 
166 See id. 
167 See P.K. Daniel, Woman’s Touch on Terps; Title IX Paved Way for Maryland’s Yow, 
String of Championship Seasons, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 17, 2002, at C1; Leo 
Willingham, Peach Bowl: Maryland 30, Tennessee 3: Terps Right at Dome, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., at 1C; supra Table 1. 
168 See College Game Day: Chick-Fil-A Peach Bowl: Fan Guide, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Dec. 31, 2002, at 5C. 
169 See Dan Wetzel, Maryland Relishes First of Hopefully Many NCAA Titles, CBS 
Sportsline, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/b/page/pressbox/0,1328,5192180,00.html (Apr. 2, 
2002) (describing Maryland’s national championship and the program’s resurgence since 
the death of Len Bias); supra Table 1. 
170 See supra Table 2. 
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of $10,004,293 and $11,481,954, respectively, between the 1999 
and 2003 fiscal years.171 
In that same period, the academic quality of the student body 
improved correspondingly.172  Over the four years examined, 
Maryland received increasingly more applications for the incoming 
class.  Admissions became increasingly competitive and the 
percentage of accepted applications fell.173  The Maryland 
admissions office received over 4,000 more applications for the 
2002 entering class than it received for the 1999 entering class.174  
Those students, on average, had high school GPAs that were a 
quarter-point higher and scored an average of forty points higher 
on their SATs.175 
When examining these figures, it is important to note the 
correlating time periods.  The success of a football season would 
likely be reflected in the following year’s revenue earnings and 
admissions statistics.176  The basketball season, however, spans 
two calendar years and ends early in the second year.177  Success 
within a basketball season would be jointly represented in the 
current and following fiscal years (i.e., the year in which the 
season ended and the next year).  Additionally, considering that 
Maryland requires applicants for the incoming class to submit the 
first portion of their application by the end of January, and all 
accepted students must confirm their decision to attend the school 
by May 1st, the basketball season would affect the following 
year’s student-applications.178  For instance, the 2002 incoming 
class would likely in part reflect the 2001 football team’s success, 
but would not be affected by the 2001–02 basketball team’s 
 
171 See supra Table 2. 
172 See supra Table 3. 
173 See supra Table 3. 
174 See supra Table 3. 
175 See supra Table 3. 
176 The college football post-season traditionally ends by the first week of January. See, 
e.g., University of Maryland, supra note 159 (demonstrating that the 2001–02 football 
season schedule ended January 2, 2002). 
177 See University of Maryland Football Game Results, supra note 159 (displaying the 
2001–02 Basketball Season, which ran from November 2, 2001, through April 1, 2002). 
178 See University of Maryland, Freshman Application Dates, Undergraduate 
Admissions, at http://www.uga.umd.edu/apply/dates.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2003). 
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national championship.  Since Maryland won the championship 
April 2002, it is likely that the 2003 incoming class will most 
adequately reflect this athletic success. 
Examination of these figures reveals a correlation between the 
on-the-field success of a university’s teams and the benefits that 
accrue to the school.  The underlying purpose justifying the 
NCAA’s rules—to promote amateur sport—may have already 
been thwarted.  Effectively, under the Amateurism Bylaws, 
colleges and universities reap significant financial benefits from 
their star student-athletes while the preventing student-athletes 
from capitalizing on their own name and likeness. 
2. Anti-Competitive Effects of the Amateurism Bylaws 
Courts have rejected student-athletes’ antitrust claims on the 
basis that the athlete is not a “competitor” with the NCAA or its 
member institutions,179 but students and the NCAA or universities 
might be viewed as competitors in terms of marketing or 
sponsorship deals.  If companies were permitted to sponsor 
individual athletes, the college teams and the NCAA as a whole 
would be competing with those individuals to gain lucrative 
endorsement contracts.  A star student-athlete might make a team 
more attractive to marketers and to consumers, but if marketers 
could simply invest in that star, they would potentially bypass 
negotiating a deal with the university or the NCAA.  For instance, 
upon learning that Bloom was signing with the University of 
Colorado, Nike, with whom Bloom had previously been 
negotiating, stated “there was no reason for it to enter into a skiing 
sponsorship contract with [Bloom] because the NCAA Bylaws 
essentially made [him] a Nike athlete for the next four (4) 
years.”180  In 1995, the University of Colorado entered into a 
ground-breaking, five-year deal with Nike for $5.6 million, 
renegotiated in 2000, under which all but two of the university’s 
 
179 See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 978 F. Supp. 213, 217 (W.D. Pa. 
1997) (“‘[T]he plaintiff is currently a student, not a businessman in the traditional sense, 
and certainly not a ‘competitor’ within the contemplation of the antitrust laws.’” (quoting 
Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Ma. 1975))), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, and rev’d in part, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998). 
180 Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 52. 
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seventeen athletic teams would be outfitted in Nike attire and 
equipment.181  These contracts are not limited to the University of 
Colorado.  Seven of the eight teams competing in the 2002 Bowl 
Championship Series had agreements with Nike.182  In the 2002 
NCAA Basketball Tournament, forty-nine of the sixty-five 
competing schools were “Nike schools,” including all four teams 
competing in the Final Four.183 
If the NCAA’s rules had not prevented Bloom from entering 
into a Nike (or similar) contract, then Bloom could compete with 
the University of Colorado or the NCAA for corporate 
sponsorship.  The NCAA’s rules are, therefore, anticompetitive by 
ensuring that universities do not have to compete with their own 
athletes for advertising and merchandising monies.  Given that the 
NCAA has abandoned amateurism (as demonstrated by the 
University of Maryland) and that it has thwarted competition 
within the sports sponsorship and endorsement market, the only 
consequence is that the NCAA Bylaws have no legitimate purpose 
and have anticompetitive effects.  Therefore, the rules are an 
unreasonable restraint of trade and should be invalidated for 
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.184  As such, the rules may be 
 
181 See Adam Thompson, Clotheslined CU Figures to Take a Hit Even if the Big 12 
School Renews Its Lucrative Nike Contract, Which Expires This Weekend, DENVER POST, 
June 26, 2001, at D1. 
182 See id. 
183 Mike Huguenin, Now You Seed Them? No, You Don’t, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., 
Mar. 30, 2002, at C2 (noting that most of the remaining teams had agreements with 
Adidas, Reebok, and And 1). 
184 See Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of 
College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 327 (1998). 
[A] student-athlete may convince a court that Rule 15.2 is invalid by showing 
that it is not connected to the legitimate goals of the NCAA.  Such a challenge 
would seek to establish that the NCAA has abandoned the goal of combining 
education with athletics . . . .  Without a connection to legitimate goals, the 
NCAA’s entire regulatory program fits a pattern of purely anti-competitive 
behavior, and should be invalidated as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  
Additionally, if a student-athlete can prove that the NCAA’s rules are aimed at 
maximizing profits, and not at upholding traditional goals, an argument can be 
made that these restrictions should be treated and rejected as regulations within 
a purely commercial market. 
Id. 
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deemed an unreasonable restraint of trade and should be 
invalidated for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
V. MODIFICATIONS TO THE AMATEURISM BYLAWS 
A. Amateurism Deregulation 
If the Amateurism Bylaws were invalidated, amateurism may 
survive, albeit under different circumstances.  There have been a 
plethora of proposals suggested by outside media sources, as well 
as the NCAA itself, ranging from modifying the NCAA 
amateurism rules to abolishing them entirely.  For instance, Tom 
Farrey, an ESPN.com writer, proposed providing players with 
outright payments through a form of revenue-sharing to allow the 
student-athlete to be compensated based on the earnings they 
provide for their individual schools.185  Farrey notes, “Over a four-
year college athletic career, that means the average Syracuse player 
is theoretically ‘underpaid’ by more then $1.8 million.”186  This is, 
however, too far-reaching a proposition.  The goal of collegiate 
amateur sports should not be abandoned altogether.  Paying 
athletes for their participation in their “collegiate” amateur sport, 
as opposed to another sport in which they compete professionally, 
might create more problems than it solves. 
The NCAA itself has considered numerous proposals to modify 
its amateurism rules.  The Amateurism Deregulation Proposals 
were adopted by the Division II schools, and were considered, but 
largely rejected by Division I.187  These proposals take two forms: 
post-enrollment and pre-enrollment.188  The pre-enrollment 
 
185 See Tom Farrey, Play-for-Pay: Not Yet, but Soon?, ESPN, at http://espn.go.com/ 
ncb/ncaatourney01/s/2001/0326/1162258.html (Mar. 28, 2001). 
186 Id. 
187 See Adam Wodon, D-II Passes Amateurism Deregulation; D-I Next?, USCHO, at 
http://uscollegehockey.com/news/2001/01/09_001551.php (Jan. 9, 2001); NCAA, 
Division I Management Council,  at http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/governance/ 
division_I/management_council/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003). 
188 NCAA, Postenrollment Amateurism Deregulation Proposals, at 
http://www12.ncaa.org/membership/governance/division_I/docs/board_of_dirs/2001_08_
Board_of_Directors/07_Att_B_2001_08_BOd_Amateurism.htm (July 11, 2001) 
[hereinafter Post-enrollment Proposals]; NCAA, Pre-Enrollment Amateurism 
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proposals are inapplicable to Bloom’s case because, while he 
engaged in professional athletics prior to competing as a collegiate 
athlete, the debate centers around his ongoing marketing activities 
while he is enrolled in the University of Colorado.  Post-
enrollment proposals include allowing the NCAA to pay insurance 
premiums on behalf of student-athletes who qualify for disability 
insurance; for student-athletes to obtain a loan for up to $20,000 
during their five-year eligibility period based on future earnings; 
and a fee-for-lesson provision, allowing student-athletes to accept 
up to $2,000 in compensation for teaching their athletic skills to 
others.189 
These proposals, even if they had been enacted, would not have 
enabled Bloom to reasonably continue his skiing career.  His 
concern is not based on disability insurance; he needs funding to 
support his elite skiing.  Likewise, the fee-for-lesson provision is 
of minimal assistance, because even if Bloom earned up to the 
$2,000 cap, this would do little to dent the debt he would incur 
participating in elite ski competition.190  Lastly, the loan based on 
future earnings does not allow Bloom to earn all of the money 
necessary for him to continue competing.  Even if this limitation 
was raised, however, it would be of little assistance to Bloom 
based on the structure of elite skiing.  He needs endorsement 
money to cover his skiing costs.  This is, and will be, the case for 
as long as he competes in the sport.  A loan against future earnings 
would not rectify Bloom’s situation because those endorsements 
will be needed to pay for that current year’s skiing.  Perhaps no 
general proposals could alleviate his predicament, but in light of 
the perpetual problems the Amateurism Rules create, the NCAA 
should be vigilant to accommodate these student-athletes whose 
talents separate them from the “average” athlete. 
As this Note demonstrates, the current system results in several 
injustices to student-athletes.  Modifications to the current bylaws 
could be made that would protect the most talented student-athletes 
 
Deregulation Proposals, at  http://www12.ncaa.org/membership/governance/division_I/ 
docs/board_of_dirs/2001_08_Board_of_Directors/07_Att_A_200108_BOD_Amateurism
.htm (July 11, 2001) [hereinafter Pre-enrollment Proposals]. 
189 Post-enrollment Proposals, supra note 188. 
190 See King, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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from being exploited by their own colleges or universities while 
preserving amateurism.  Accommodations could be made that 
would be fairer to the athlete and would not result in unjust 
enrichment of the school. 
A. Proposed Solutions 
It has been suggested that the NCAA establish a trust fund 
system similar to that instituted by the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC).191  USOC regulations permit athletes to retain 
their amateur status, while still allowing the athlete to receive 
monetary compensation granted by the committee.192  The program 
allows such funds to be collected into a trust fund, from which the 
athlete may withdraw to cover her sport-related expenses.193  The 
remainder may be withdrawn once she has completed her amateur 
career.194  Such a system would alleviate some of the amateurism 
rules’ inherent unfairness.  In Bloom’s situation, the money could 
be deposited into a trust fund to support his ski endeavors.  
Meanwhile, such a system would ensure that other athletes could 
not simply profit.  To ensure that student-athletes are not abusing 
this system, each student’s trust account should be supervised by 
an NCAA-appointed (and student-athlete-approved) trustee.  The 
trustee could withdraw the money for activities determined to be 
“appropriate.”  This determination could be made at the outset, 
when the trust account is first established, and would be the result 
of a negotiation between the NCAA and the individual student-
athlete or the student’s university.  Whether a student-athlete’s 
usage of his or her funds is appropriate should be a case-by-case 
determination, accounting for the specific circumstances unique to 
each individual student-athlete.  The standards set forth in this 
negotiation should be put into writing and a dispute resolution 
process should also be agreed upon to ensure a fair process for the 
 
191 See Belo, supra note 125, at 154. 
192 See id.; Christine Brennan, No Small Change for USOC; Budget Burgeons, Attitude 
Shifts, but Pennies Can Pinch Athletes; No Small Change for Olympics, yet Pennies Can 
Pinch Athletes, WASH. POST, May 12, 1996, at D01 (describing Operation Gold, “which 
pays athletes for medals won at the Olympics and world championships, a reward system 
instituted for the first time in 1980, and beefed up considerably in 1989”). 
193 See Belo, supra note 125, at 154. 
194 See id. 
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determination of expenditures that may or may not have been 
foreseeable at the time the account was created. 
Another solution for athletes whose secondary “professional” 
sport is regulated by the USOC and/or the relevant national 
governing body (NGB), would be to adopt an exception similar to 
that carved out by the NCAA in its Olympic Gold Grant 
program.195  Specifically, the NCAA allows former Olympians to 
retain their collegiate amateur status while receiving funds 
administered by the USOC.196  Under the Olympic Gold Grant 
program, “a student-athlete remains an ‘amateur’ completely 
eligible to play college sports after being directly paid $25,000 in 
cash in exchange for each Olympic gold-medal winning 
performance.  The Operation Gold program also permits sizable 
cash payments to ‘amateurs’ for silver and bronze medal 
performances.”197  There is no logical justification for why an 
athlete may be permitted to receive money as a reward for their 
Olympic performance, yet not be able to receive the necessary 
funding to compete and train in Olympic and elite-caliber 
competition. A fair compromise may be to have the endorsement 
money flow through the USOC and/or the relevant NGB (e.g., U.S. 
Skiing), as an agent for the athlete.  The money could then be paid 
by the USOC to cover training and equipment costs.  In a sense, 
this would assign the USOC a trustee-like position, protecting the 
money on behalf of the athlete, while ensuring that the money is 
being allocated for “appropriate” expenditures. 
The NCAA’s aforementioned proposal to grant student-athletes 
a loan based upon their future earnings,198 while not alleviating 
Bloom’s financial burdens, might be effectively modified to 
provide a reasonable solution to Bloom’s problem.  First, the limit 
of the loan should be individualized to the particular student-
athlete, and not be based upon an arbitrary number.199  After an 
examination of the surrounding circumstances, including the 
student’s needs and intended use of the money, a limit could be 
 
195 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
196 See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.1.1.1.4.3.2, at 71. 
197 Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 32. 
198 See Post-enrollment Proposal, supra note 188. 
199 See id.  The post-enrollment proposal amount is $20,000. 
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agreed upon by the NCAA, the pertinent member-institution, and 
the student-athlete.  Again, it is imperative that this be a case-by-
case determination rather than a per se rule.  Problems arise in the 
current regime because of the amateurism rules’ rigidity and their 
inflexibility towards those student-athletes that do not fit neatly 
into the box of standard, average collegiate athletes. 
Second, a necessary modification to the current proposal would 
alter the loan’s dependency on future earnings.200  For reasons 
previously described, a loan on future earnings may not be a 
reasonable solution for athletes such as Bloom.  A better solution 
would be to allow student-athletes to receive traditional loans that 
would cover the necessary costs and expenditures, i.e., those costs 
that the endorsements would have previously paid.  The student-
athlete could then repay these loans on an installment basis and be 
liable as a traditional creditor would be.  The best case scenario 
would be for the NCAA to grant these loans upon a demonstration 
of need and possibly a demonstration that this money was available 
from other venues that the NCAA’s rules have denied the student-
athlete.  This would enable the NCAA to regulate who is receiving 
the loans and how the monies are being used, and it would also 
allow the students to receive the loan at a more desirable interest 
rate than a college student would likely otherwise be able to obtain.  
The amount of money loaned should be based upon the student-
athlete’s need in proportion to the forfeited opportunities, and not a 
literal evaluation of future earnings. 
CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s rules prohibiting Jeremy Bloom from retaining 
the ski-related endorsements necessary to continue in elite 
competition should be invalidated under numerous legal theories.  
Even if the rules themselves could be saved by virtue of the fact 
that they support the NCAA’s stated purpose of furthering 
amateurism, an exception should be made in Bloom’s case.  The 
opportunities presented to Bloom had nothing to do with his 
collegiate football career and arrangements could have been made 
 
200 See id. 
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to accommodate the needs of this talented student-athlete.  
Examination of the facts of Bloom’s case reveals that a prohibition 
here does nothing to further the NCAA’s goals, but only serves to 
injure Bloom and student-athletes like him.  For an association that 
exists by virtue of student-athletes, and is designed to protect these 
individuals, this outcome is unreasonable and wrong. 
